What Would Be Wrong with a User-Friendly Code: The Drafting of Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code by Lawrence, Lary
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1993
What Would Be Wrong with a User-Friendly
Code: The Drafting of Revised Articles 3 and 4 of
the Uniform Commercial Code
Lary Lawrence
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lary Lawrence, What Would Be Wrong with a User-Friendly Code: The Drafting of Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 659 (1993).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol26/iss3/11
WHAT WOULD BE WRONG WITH A USER-
FRIENDLY CODE?: THE DRAFTING OF
REVISED ARTICLES 3 AND 4 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Lary Lawrence*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of negotiable instruments would not seem to be a particu-
larly difficult area of law. A negotiable instrument, as an unconditional
promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, is a very simple crea-
ture. The potential problems arising from a transaction involving a nego-
tiable instrument are far fewer than arise from, for example, the sale of
goods. Similarly, bank collection does not appear to be a particularly
difficult area of law. How many issues can arise concerning a bank's
collection and payment of an item?
Despite the seeming simplicity of their subject matter, both the orig-
inal Articles 3 and 4, as well as their 1990 versions are probably the most
inaccessible articles of the entire Uniform Commercial Code. Appar-
ently, accessibility was not a major concern of the drafters. This Essay
explores the drafting problems that make these articles inaccessible to
most of their users and analyzes the reasons for these problems. Hope-
fully, such exploration and analysis will enable the drafters of future
commercial codes to focus on ways to make their codes more user-
friendly.
II. PROBLEMS WITH FORMER ARTICLE 3
The modern law of negotiable instruments began in England in the
mid-eighteenth century with a series of decisions by Lord Mansfield.
Miller v. Race I was the first decision, and the law has changed little dur-
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of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Coauthor of the following books: 4 WILLIAM D.
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ing the last 200 years. Negotiable instruments law was first codified in
the United States in 1896 in the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).2
The NIL worked reasonably well and was generally accepted among
both lawyers and bankers.3 On the whole, the statutory language
adopted by the states was uniform, even though there were variations in
some versions.' This uniformity in statutory language, however, did not
result in a corresponding uniformity in judicial interpretation. There was
a split of authority as to the interpretation of roughly 75 of the 198 sec-
tions of the NIL.'
Believing that the NIL was basically a sound statutory scheme, the
drafters decided not to make any substantial structural revisions when
drafting the original version of Article 3.6 Instead they pursued three
rather limited objectives. First, they wanted to ensure uniformity among
the states.7 To accomplish this, they chose the better rule among the
splits of authority that existed under the NIL, thereby attempting to
avoid conflict.' Second, they wanted to modernize some of the NIL's
more outdated rules.9 Third, they intended to reorganize and simplify
some of the NIL's more cumbersome provisions.10
The limited scope of the drafters' mission took its toll on the final
product. Many problems existed."' Article 3's terminology was often
internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with the terminology used
in Article 4.12 Important terms like "holder,"13 "paid"" and "value" Is
were used loosely and inconsistently in Article 3. Different uses of simi-
2. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (1896) (superseded by U.C.C. art. 3).
3. See 2 STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION: STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 776 (1955) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COM-
MISSION]; Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L.
REV. 367, 368 (1957).
4. See 2 REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 775.
5. Id. at 776; see William A. Schnader, The New Commercial Code: Modernizing Our
Uniform CommercialActs, 36 A.B.A. J. 179, 181 (1950).
6. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 380.
7. Fairfax Leary, Jr., Commercial Paper: Article III, 16 ARK. L. REV. & BAR ASS'N J.
33, 34-35 (1961); Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 380; Schnader, supra note 5, at 179.
8. See Leary, supra note 7, at 34-35; Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 380; Schnader, supra
note 5, at 182.
9. See Leary, supra note 7, at 35; Schnader, supra note 5, at 182.
10. See Richard Cosway, Negotiable Instruments in the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Bus.
L. REV. 222, 224 (1954).
11. See Lary Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Suggested Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1983).
12. Id. at 125-36.
13. Id. at 126-31.
14. Id. at 131-34.
15. Id. at 134-36.
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lar terms in Articles 3 and 4 gave the illusion of what were really non-
existent conflicts. For example, use of the phrase "payment is final" in
section 3-418 and use of the phrase "finally paid" in section 4-213 led
some courts to improperly conclude that these two sections were in con-
flict.16 In reality, the sections referred to completely different issues.
Many sections of Article 3 were not comprehensive, therefore reference
to rules outside the Code was necessary to supplement the rules found in
its provisions.17 For example, issues regarding conversion, 8 accommo-
dation parties' defenses 9 and the finality of payment and acceptance °
were left to the common law. Unfortunately, it was seldom clear from
the language of the provision whether such a reference was required.
The failure of the drafters to provide for changes in technology and
business practices caused other problems. Many sections, although
seemingly applicable, reached unacceptable results when applied to un-
anticipated situations.21 For example, because cashier's checks were not
widely used prior to the drafting of former Article 3, these cash-like
equivalents were not given any special treatment by the Code. Courts,
however, created problems when they attempted to apply the provisions
of Articles 3 and 4 to cashier's checks, when the provisions were drafted
with ordinary checks in mind.22 Specifically, courts were split between
applying former section 3-306, which allowed the issuing bank to raise
defenses against a person who did not have the rights of a holder in due
course, and protecting the public's view of cashier's checks as cash
equivalents, which required denying the bank the right to refuse payment
on such checks.23 Although the latter decisions appeared more logical,
they were without any support in the Code.
2 4
III. REVISED ARTICLES 3 AND 4
Fortunately, when Articles 3 and 4 were revised, the drafters recog-
nized and satisfactorily resolved many problems. For example, the ter-
minology employed throughout revised Article 3 is internally consistent
16. Compare Natural Say. & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d 1303, 1306 (6th Cir. 1983)
(deciding that drafters' did not intend § 4-213 to supersede § 3-418), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
939 (1984) with Town & Country State Bank v. First State Bank, 358 N.W.2d 387, 395 (Minn.
1984) (holding that § 4-213 must prevail over § 3-418).
17. See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 136-43.
18. Id. at 137-39.
19. Id. at 139-42.
20. Id. at 142-43.
21. Id. at 143-49.
22. Id. at 144-47.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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and is consistent with the terms used in Article 4. The drafters defined
and cross-referenced all the relevant terms.2" In addition, the drafters
attempted to indicate in the official comments when a Code provision
was not meant to be exclusive.2 6 On many occasions, the drafters even
indicated the federal or state law to be applied."
Despite these improvements, Articles 3 and 4 are still largely inac-
cessible. There are several reasons for this inaccessibility. First, one
must understand the entire statutory scheme in order to find answers to
basic questions. Although the drafters did a wonderful job of providing
an analytically tight system, a researcher must either know where to look
or search through the entire article to find the answer to a basic question.
Even if one is familiar with the approach adopted by former Articles 3
and 4, the researcher may have trouble finding the answer in the revised
articles.
A. Restructuring of Analysis
As to several basic commercial law issues, the drafters made the
questionable decision to restructure the analysis found in former Articles
3 and 4. In some situations, the new approach is completely different
from that contained in former Articles 3 and 4. As a result, lawyers,
businesspersons and judges must re-learn the law. Requiring re-
education of the Code, and the availing potential for judicial misinterpre-
tation, was unnecessary.
One of the areas where this new approach causes problems is the
law governing discharge upon payment.28 For example, suppose Paul
makes a note payable to Steve who indorses the note to Mary. Under
former Article 3, Steve would be discharged upon Paul's payment to
Mary. The analysis by which this result was reached is simple. Paul is
discharged under former section 3-603(1) by his payment to Mary. Steve
is discharged under former section 3-606(l)(a), because Steve had a right
of recourse against Paul. Upon Paul's payment to Mary, Paul may not
recover from Steve.
Under revised Article 3, however, it is unclear whether Steve is dis-
charged in this situation. Revised Article 3 eliminated the omnibus pro-
vision found in former section 3-606(l)(a) which provides that discharge
of a party also discharges any party that has a right of recourse against
the party discharged. Therefore, under revised Article 3, Paul's payment
25. U.C.C. §§ 3-103, 4-104 to -105 (1990).
26. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-417 to -418.
27. See, eg., id §§ 3-417, 4-207.
28. See id § 3-605.
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does not seem to result in Steve's discharge. Paul still cannot recover
from Steve because Steve's obligation as an indorser runs only to a subse-
quent indorser who pays the instrument or to a person who is entitled to
enforce the instrument. 9 Paul is neither. However, if Mary indorses the
note to Paul, who then negotiates the note to Bill, Bill, as a person enti-
tled to enforce the note, could recover from Steve. Can Bill recover from
Steve if Bill does not have the rights of a holder in due course? Under
former Article 3, the answer was "no." Steve's discharge was effective
under former section 3-602 against any person other than a holder in due
course without notice of the discharge. But, under revised Article 3,
Steve would not appear to have a discharge that he could assert against
Bill. Steve's only recourse would appear to be to recover from Paul after
paying Bill. It is unlikely that the drafters intended this result. How-
ever, revised Article 3 gives no indication as to their intent. If the draft-
ers intended that Steve not be discharged, such a substantial change from
former Article 3 should have been made clear in the comments. If Steve
was intended to be discharged, the drafters should have provided in re-
vised section 3-602 that discharge of the payor also discharges any party
having a right of recourse against the payor.
A similar problem exists with understanding the bank collection
process set forth in Article 4. For example, four concepts integral to
understanding the bank collection process are: final settlement, final pay-
ment, the payor bank's right to recover a provisional settlement, and the
payor bank's accountability. The relationship of these concepts is care-
fully set forth in sections 4-213, 4-215, 4-301 and 4-302. However, un-
derstanding their relationship to one another is similar to solving a jigsaw
puzzle. Not only is it time-consuming, but it is easy to reach incorrect
inferences. To further complicate matters, much of the collection and
payment process has been preempted by Federal Regulations CC and J.
30
Although there are frequent cross-references to these regulations in Arti-
cle 4, their precise impact on Article 4 is not always clear. Further, be-
cause Regulations CC and J are subject to amendment by the Federal
Reserve Board, a practitioner can easily overlook a relevant change.
B. Adoption or Rejection of Prior Law
The second problem with revised Articles 3 and 4 is that, at times,
the official comments to the provisions of revised Article 3 refer to for-
mer Article 3 without any indication as to whether the revised provisions
29. See id. § 3-415(a).
30. Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1992); Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1992).
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were intended to adopt or reject the prior law. For example, the official
comment to revised section 3-504 states: "Section 3-504 is largely a re-
statement of former Section 3-511. Subsection (4) of former Section 3-
511 is replaced by Section 3-502(f). ' 3 However, the full page of com-
ments accompanying former section 3-511 is not included in the official
comment to section 3-504. Does this mean that these former comments
no longer represent the applicable rule? Or does it mean that these for-
mer comments are good authority? If it is the latter, why were they not
included in the revised official comment? If it is the former, should not
the official comment indicate the change? The official comments to sec-
tions 3-114, 3-119 and 3-604 pose similar problems.
C. Interpretation of Terms
Third, it is sometimes difficult to know whether to interpret a term
or section narrowly or broadly. At times, the drafters intended that a
term be vague in order to allow a court to decide on a case-by-case basis
what the result should be, while at other times, terms are used precisely.
However, whether the drafters intended one or the other is not always
clear. For example, an instrument to be governed by revised Article 3
must be payable in a fixed amount.32 In determining whether an instru-
ment is payable in a fixed amount, section 3-104(a) provides that the
instrument may be payable "with or without interest or other charges
described in the promise or order. '33 To what do "other charges" re-
fer?34 The official comments to section 3-104 do not indicate an answer
to this question. Do "other charges" include attorney's fees and costs of
collection? They must. But former section 3-106(1)(e), which stated that
an instrument may be payable "with costs of collection or an attorney's
fee or both upon default," was omitted.35 Are stated discounts, penalties
or rebates "other charges?" Must the amount of the discount, penalty or
rebate be determinable from the instrument itself? Official comment 1 to
section 3-112 states: "Under Section 3-104(a) the requirement of a 'fixed
amount' applies only to principal. ' 3 6 Section 3-112, however, pertains
only to the payment of interest.37 Does this comment refer only to "in-
terest" or does it also apply to other charges? For example, is an instru-
ment negotiable if it provides for a penalty to be determined by the
31. U.C.C. § 3-504 cmt.
32. Id. § 3-112 emt. 1.
33. Id. § 3-104(a).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 3-106(1)(e) (1987) (superseded by U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1990)).
36. Id. § 3-112 cmt. 1 (1990).
37. Id. § 3-112.
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parties if payment is late? At other times, it is clear that the drafters
intended phrases to be interpreted literally. Under section 3-41 l(b), if a
bank wrongfully refuses to pay a cashier's check, the person asserting the
right to enforce the check is entitled to compensation for expenses, loss of
interest and, possibly, consequential damages38 resulting from the non-
payment. But neither expenses nor consequential damages are recover-
able if the refusal to pay is a result of the bank asserting a claim or
defense "that it has reasonable grounds to believe is available against the
person entitled to enforce the instrument."39
Under section 3-305(c), the issuing bank may assert a third party's
claim as a defense to its obligation to pay a cashier's check.' If the
third-party claim turns out to be invalid, is the bank liable for expenses
or consequential damages if it reasonably believes the claim is valid and
can be asserted against the holder? The comments to section 3-411 indi-
cate that the bank is not insulated from damages if the third-party claim
is not upheld.41 The issuing bank is relieved from such liability only if
payment is enjoined under section 3-602(b)(1). 42 These comments are
only clear if one already knows that the words "a claim or defense of the
bank" mean a claim or defense of the bank itself and not one that the
bank can assert under section 3-305(c). The precision of the words "a
claim or defense of the bank," compared to the imprecision of the words
"other charges" in section 3-104(a), make it difficult to know whether to
interpret a section narrowly or broadly.
Similarly, it is not always clear whether a provision was intended to
be exclusive. Section 4-302(b) establishes two defenses a bank may raise
to liability under section 4-302(a). First, the payor bank may defend it-
self by proving that the plaintiff breached a presenter's warranties under
section 4-208.43 Second, the payor bank may assert a defense by proving
that the person seeking to enforce the payor bank's accountability
presented or transferred the item to defraud the payor bank.' Under
former Article 4, some courts believed a payor bank should not be able to
defend against its liability under former section 4-302 by proving a right
38. Id. § 3-411(b).
39. Id. § 3-411(c).
40. Id. § 3-305(c).
41. Id. § 3-411 cmt. 3.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 4-302(b).
44. Id. § 4-302 cmt. 3; see American Nat'l Bank v. Foodbasket, 497 P.2d 546, 547 (Wyo.
1972).
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to recover the mistaken payment under former section 3-418.11 Other
courts disagreed.4
By listing two defenses to the payor bank's accountability in section
4-302(b), did the drafters intend that no other defenses be available?
Neither the text nor the comments answer this question. The issue is
muddied by section 3-418(d) which, although specifically giving a payor
bank the right to recover a mistaken payment notwithstanding final pay-
ment under section 4-215,17 does not mention whether the bank also has
a defense to its accountability for an item.48 There would appear to be no
reason to distinguish between the bank's accountability for an item under
section 4-302 and its final payment of the item under section 4-215. A
bank is accountable for an item for which it has not made final payment
only if the bank has failed to settle for the item on the day of receipt.49
The bank's failure to settle for an item should not deprive it of the right
to defend against its accountability if it could have recovered the pay-
ment had it so settled.
Comparably, section 4-407 governs when a payor bank has a right
of subrogation upon improper payment of an item.50 The section specifi-
cally lists two situations in which the payor bank has subrogation
rights.5 It then provides that the payor bank has subrogation rights
"otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the
drawer or maker."52 What are these other circumstances? Neither the
text nor the comments to section 4-407 provide any indication.
As a result of this statutory vagueness, courts are without guidance
as to when to allow a payor bank subrogation rights. A few situations
clearly allow subrogation rights. For example, a bank that makes early
payment of a post-dated check, in violation of proper notice of post-dat-
ing issued by the drawer under section 4-401(c), should have a right of
45. See, e.g., State & Say. Bank v. Meeker, 469 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Kirby v.
First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 168 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1969); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Midland Nat'l Bank, 292 N.W.2d 591 (Wis. 1980).
46. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Western Bank, 841 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.
1987); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987); National Say. & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d
1303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 939 (1984); Demos v. Lyons, 376 A.2d 1352 (N.J.
1977). But see North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 449 F. Supp. 616
(D.S.C. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1305 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).
47. U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 4.
48. Id. § 3-418(d).
49. Id. § 4-302.
50. Id. § 4-407.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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subrogation. Similarly, a bank with knowledge of its customer's death
that pays a check more than ten days after the death and therefore can-
not debit its customer's account, would also seem to have a right of sub-
rogation. 3 But how does a court know whether the drafters intended a
bank to suffer loss in these situations? The drafters should have listed the
situations in which section 4-407 was meant to apply.
D. Resolution of Issues Under Non-Code Law
Fourth, a few sections of Article 3 expressly leave resolution of im-
portant issues to non-Code law, although guidance by the drafters would
have been easy and helpful. For example, section 3-420 specifically pro-
vides: "The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to
instruments. '5 4 The drafters omitted former sections 3-419(l)(a) and
(b), which provided for a drawee's or payor's liability for conversion
when it refused upon demand to pay, accept or return an instrument. 55
Official comment 1 to revised section 3-420 states:
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of former Section 3-419(1) are deleted
as inappropriate in cases of noncash items that may be deliv-
ered for acceptance or payment in collection letters that contain
varying instructions as to what to do in the event of nonpay-
ment on the day of delivery. It is better to allow such cases to
be governed by the general law of conversion that would ad-
dress the issue of when, under the circumstances prevailing, the
presenter's right to possession has been denied.56
The problem is deciding what circumstances a court should consider in
making these decisions. May the court refer to decisions under former
section 3-419? No guidance is given by the drafters to answer this ques-
tion. The drafters are more familiar than the courts with the factors that
should be considered in determining whether an action for conversion
should lie. There is no reason for the drafters to leave the judicial system
without guidance on this, issue.
Correspondingly, section 3-418(a) lists two situations in which a
drawee may recover a mistaken payment or revoke a mistaken accept-
ance: if the drawer's signature is unauthorized, and if payment was made
in violation of a stop-payment order.5 7 Section 3-418(b) then provides
that whether a mistaken payment can be recovered or a mistaken accept-
53. See id. § 4-405(a).
54. Id. § 3-420(a).
55. Id. § 3-420 cmt. 1.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 3-418(a).
April 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ance revoked in other situations depends upon the law governing mistake
and restitution. 8 Official comment 3 to section 3-418 specifically pro-
vides that if the payor-drawee has misread the balance of the drawer's
account or if the drawer has no account with the drawee, whether the
drawee may recover the payment depends upon the law of restitution.
The comment goes so far as to analyze these cases under the Restatement
of Restitution .
It is unreasonable to refer courts and lawyers to the common law of
restitution as to both the types of "mistakes" for which restitution may
be available and the conditions under which restitution may be available.
Based on a century of case law, the drafters had knowledge of the poten-
tial mistakes. The drafters should have decided whether restitution
would be available in these situations. It makes little sense to have courts
rethink these issues time and time again. For example, the drafters
should have indicated in the comments that the drawee may not recover
a payment if its claimed mistake is that the drawer had a defense of
which the drawee was unaware.
Similarly, if the drawee pays a draft over a valid stop-payment order
or over the unauthorized signature of the drawer, section 3-418(a) specif-
ically states that the drawee's rights are not affected by its failure to exer-
cise ordinary care in paying or accepting the draft.' The effect of the
negligence of a payor or acceptor in other situations, however, is mysteri-
ously left to the law of restitution and mistake."
E. Absence of Basic Rules
Fifth, the Code does not expressly state some basic rules, and there
is no apparent reason for their absence. For example, section 3-501(b)
provides that presentment may be made at the place of payment of the
instrument, and must be made at the place of payment if the instrument
is payable at a bank in the United States. 62 Although the Code affirma-
tively states "where presentment may be made,"' 6a the Code does not
mention any other places where presentment may be made. Official com-
ment 1 to former section 3-504 clearly stated: "This section is intended
to simplify the rules as to how presentment is made and to make it clear
58. Id. § 3-418(b).
59. Id. cmt. 3; see GEORGE E. PALMER, 3 THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 14.9, at 181-86
(1978).
60. U.C.C. § 3-418(a).
61. Id. § 3-418(b).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 3-501(b) (emphasis added).
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that any demand upon the party to pay is a presentment no matter where
or how."" In contrast, the official comment to revised section 3-501
states: "Subsection (b)(1) states the place and manner of presentment."6
Does this mean that presentment may only be made at the place of pay-
ment? Although a negative answer to this question may be obvious to
the drafters, it may not be obvious to a holder of an instrument or his or
her lawyer. Why did the drafters omit official comment 1 to former sec-
tion 3-504? Better yet, why was this basic rule not included in the text of
revised section 3-501?
Revised section 4-206 poses a similar problem. It simplifies the pro-
cess of transfer between banks by providing that any agreed method that
identifies the transferor bank is sufficient for the item's further transfer to
another bank.66 The transfer is accomplished without an indorsement by
the transferor bank.67 Any symbol that identifies the transferor bank is
sufficient.68 Does the transferee bank become a holder by compliance
with the requirements of section 4-206 when the transferor bank fails to
indorse the item? An affirmative answer to this question would appear to
be appropriate. But if so, why does section 4-206 speak of transfer69
rather than negotiation?
IV. WHAT IS WRONG WITH A USER-FRIENDLY CODE?
The question continues to haunt me: "What is wrong with a user-
friendly Code?" In seeking an answer to this question, two types of
problems appear. First, there are problems regarding the composition of
the members of the drafting committee. Second, there are problems re-
garding the manner of drafting.
A. Composition of the Drafting Committee
There is nothing so inherently difficult about the principles gov-
erning the law of negotiable instruments and bank collection to justify
making Articles 3 and 4 inaccessible. Ironically, it seems that the pri-
mary cause of inaccessibility is that the persons involved in the drafting
process had no idea that the law of negotiable instruments and bank col-
lection was and continues to be inaccessible. Looking at the list of advi-
sors and persons who attended the drafting meetings, it is apparent
64. Id § 2-504 cmt. 1 (1987) (superseded by U.C.C. § 3-504 (1990)).
65. Id. § 3-501 cmt (1990).
66. Id. § 4-206.
67. Id. § 4-206 cmt.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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virtually all participants are either employed by banks, clearing houses or
the Federal Reserve Bank.70
Because all the persons intimately involved in the project were so
familiar with the terms, concepts and operations of the law of negotiable
instruments and bank collection, the level of discussion was far more
concerned with the proposed substantive rules than with the manner of
their expression. In addition, because the terminology was second nature
to virtually all of the participants, it was difficult for them to look
through the eyes of a lawyer or judge who is not as well versed in these
areas. Like an artist who understands his or her genre too well, drafters
of codes in technological areas also need outside collaborators. For ex-
ample, consider a film written and directed by the same person.
Although that person knows better than anyone what he or she intends
to communicate, the writer-director may not have the perspective to as-
certain whether the style and manner of expression of the ideas reaches
filmgoers. The writer-director is too close to the subject matter. Every
nuance has a meaning. These nuances are often not visible to any but the
most dedicated of fans.
The active participants in drafting revised Articles 3 and 4 were all
too knowledgeable about the former law.71 Because they were so familiar
with former Articles 3 and 4, they knew what it meant when a comment
stated "restates section 3-605." Similarly, they knew what changes were
intended; they knew what remained the same. They knew under what
circumstances an instrument should be found to be converted or when a
drawee should be entitled to recover a mistaken payment.
The drafting process must include persons who are outside the spe-
cific area. Unfortunately, any such person would have no incentive to
become involved in the process. It is essential that the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, as promulgators of the Uniform Commercial Code, choose a
co-reporter who does not have intimate knowledge of the specific field of
law covered by the particular article of the Code under revision. If such
a co-reporter is not selected, it is necessary that outsiders have an impor-
tant voice in drafting the article.
B. The Manner of Drafting a Commercial Code
In writing Articles 3 and 4, the drafters balanced the need for flexi-
bility to enable the Code to accommodate changes in technology and
70. U.C.C. art. 3 prefatory note.
71. See id
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banking practices with the need to provide sufficient guidance and cer-
tainty to allow safe planning of banking practice and commercial trans-
actions. Adopting rigid and precise rules would stifle innovations in
business practices and limit technological improvements. Rigid rules
also would deprive courts of the ability to reach reasonable and fair deci-
sions in the myriad of cases that could arise. Further, attempting to draft
a Code that comprehensively covered every unusual and difficult prob-
lem would make it difficult to use and understand.
On the other hand, commerce must be able to plan its transactions.
Especially in the area of negotiable instruments, parties must be able to
know whether the instrument they are drafting is negotiable. Potential
purchasers must be able to determine their rights in order to know
whether to purchase the instrument. Banks must know their obligations
in order to set up their routines. Insurance companies must know how
the Code allocates losses in the event of forgery or alteration so they can
set their rates.
The need for flexibility in Articles 3 and 4 does not require complex
and confusing rules. The rules should be as comprehensive and clear as
possible. A commercial code must be intelligible to lawyers who are not
well-versed in commercial practices or in the history of commercial law.
Courts should be provided the drafters' wisdom, rather than being re-
quired to fend for themselves. Judicial opinions in this area often reflect
a judge's lack of understanding of Articles 3 and 4. The drafters should
assist the courts in interpreting the Code by clearly and comprehensively
stating all the applicable rules. Extensive official comments would be
invaluable in understanding the Code and avoiding questionable judicial
opinions.
On the whole, the drafters did a very good job. However, it would
have taken very little effort to make revised Articles 3 and 4 more acces-
sible. If accessibility becomes a goal in drafting, we may finally have a
user-friendly Code.
April 1993]
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